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ABSTRACT 
 
Amy McMinn: “Friendship” of Italian Foreign Policy with its Former Colonies 
(Under the direction of Rahsaan Maxwell) 
 
  In 2008, Italy and Libya signed the Treaty on Friendship which promised $30 
billion to Libya and represented the first formal and explicit apology from any European 
state for colonialism. Although this aid was justified on colonial damages, Italy did not 
provide its other former colonies with similar measures. The primary reason Libya 
received preferential treatment in terms of financial aid and colonial apologies is due to 
its status as a transit country for migrants who were attempting to enter Europe through 
Italy. Under the Gaddafi regime, Libya provided the best opportunity to have an 
immediate and drastic effect on migration.  Since Libya has been in civil war, Italy has 
shifted its foreign policy to the countries of origin.  However, Italy still does not provide 
nearly as much aid or any apologies for colonialism because they don’t provide as great 
of an opportunity to immediately and drastically effect migration patterns.	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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 On August 30, 2008 Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Libyan Colonel 
Muhmar Gadhafi signed the controversial “Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation,” otherwise known as the Treaty on Friendship.  Although this treaty could 
be considered a step forward in terms of diplomacy with a country who had been isolated 
from the international political sphere, it was also highly criticized for the drastic rhetoric 
and provisions of resources to a controversial world leader.   In a speech to the Libyan 
people in Benghazi upon the day the treaty was signed, Berlusconi explained how; 
“Affection and cordial thanks to your Leader, who so much strongly 
wanted to come to sign this agreement.  An agreement which arrives after 
those tragic and dramatic moments of Italian occupation of your country.  
In the name of the Italian people, as chief of the government, I feel 
obliged to offer my excuses and manifest our sorrow for what happened 
many years ago and affected many of your families.  Your leader wanted 
to end this period, all these long years in which our two countries have 
collaborated, yes, but have been divided in the memory of what happened 
in those years”1 
 
This sentiment is reflected in the Treaty on Friendship itself and is particularly 
significant because it is the first instance where a head of state of any European country 
formally apologized for harm caused during colonialism.  This high level of recognition 
is surprising when considering the huge distance Italian society and academia has created 
from its colonial past, which is so closely associated with the Fascist period.   The Treaty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Federica Ferrari and Alessandro Pejrano, “Con Stile: Personality and Leadership Styles in Italy’s Foreign 	  
 
	   2 
on Friendship provides Libya with $5 billion worth of compensation by creating a coastal 
highway which will cross the Libyan border from Egypt to Tunisia, building 200 houses, 
offering funding for young Libyans who wish to study in Italy, and to pay pensions to 
victims of mines placed by Italians in the colonial age.  Furthermore, the Treaty of 
Friendship reinforces bi-lateral agreements concerning scientific, cultural, and energy 
issues and the fight against terrorism, crimes, and organizations exploiting clandestine 
migration.    
 Considering that colonialism justified the Treaty of Friendship with Libya, one 
may ask if Italy has made similar agreements, made apologies, or provided compensation 
to it’s other colonies or areas that faced Italian aggression.  Unsurprisingly, the answer is 
no.  When, and if, the Italian government refers to it’s colonial history with other 
countries, it is clear that Italy portrays the past quite differently depending on the country.  
Toscone explains the early development Italian relations with former colonies, as 
“The ‘strange decolonization’ has certainly contributed to stress and widen 
the limits of Italian development and cooperation policy:  the delay with 
which Italy confronted itself with its own colonial past, and the peculiar 
way in which the Italian political establishment portrayed the success of 
its presence in Africa.  Representing Italians as the only good colonialists 
and so reiterating the myth of the “brava gente” has certainly contributed 
to let the Italian governments and public opinion feel exempt from 
committing seriously to Third World economic development.”2 
 
However, this feeling of exemption is primarily utilized when convenient for the Italian 
government and Italy’s relationship with Libya is a clear exception to this traditional 
pattern of perpetuating the Italian “brava gente.” For example, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Pistelli visited Asmara in the summer of 2014, which was the first time an Italian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lorella Toscone, “Cooperation for Development: A ‘Natural Vocation’ for Rhetoric?” UNISCI 
Discussion Papers, No 25 (January/Enero 2011), 6. 
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politician visited Eritrea since 1997.  After meeting with Eritrean leadership, Pistelli 
released a statement saying  
“If we can manage to restart collaborations, forgetting about respective 
recriminations that by now concern only the historic dimensions of our 
relationship and that must stop to condition the present, the potential for 
Italy and Eritrea are enormous and all will have reciprocal advantages.”3 
 
This statement not only does not apologize for the harms caused during colonialism as it 
did with Libya through the Treaty of Friendship, but it implies that Eritrea has wronged 
Italy in the past and it insists that Eritrea should simply forget about that aspect of their 
history.  Why is it that Italy offers its forgiveness to one former colony but asks another 
to forget?  Why is Italy more engaged with foreign aid and apologizes for colonialism 
with Libya as opposed to its other former colonies?   
 There are many potential reasons for why Libya receives such preferential 
treatment through Italian foreign policy.  One common explanation for this relationship is 
the personalities and special friendship of their two former, controversial leaders; Gaddafi 
and Berlusconi.  Furthermore, this special treatment that is justified in terms of 
colonialism, could be explained by the fact that Gaddafi was the only leader to pursue an 
apology from Italy for colonial damages.  Italy and Libya also consider each other to be 
strong economic allies and have several economic and energy agreements that could have 
contributed to this preferential treatment among former colonies in Italian foreign policy.  
However, I argue that the most significant force for Italy’s preferential treatment in 
foreign policy towards Libya is the fact that Libya is a transit country for migrants into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	   Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, “Missione del viceministro Pistelli nel 
Corno d’Africa.  Visita in Eritrea” 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2014/07/20140702_eritrea.html/  
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Italy.  Italian foreign policy is often driven by migration, to different extents and with 
different techniques depending on potential benefits for Italy.  Libya received more 
benefits because it is a transit country for migrants, while the other former colonies are 
primarily countries of origin.  Italy is concerned about migration from all of the countries, 
but under Gaddafi, Libya provided the best opportunity to have an immediate effect on 
migration from all over the Middle East and Sub-Saharan African.  Since Libya has been 
in civil war, Italy has shifted its foreign policy concerning migration to the Horn of 
Africa and countries of origin since Libya can no longer enforce its borders to the same 
extent.  Even though Italy is focusing on these countries more than in the past, they still 
don’t provide nearly as much aid or apologies for colonialism because they don’t provide 
as great of an opportunity to immediately and drastically effect migration patterns.   
In order to fully understand the extreme preferential treatment received by Italy in 
terms of foreign aid and colonial apologies, it is important to examine Italy’s foreign 
policy towards its other former colonies.  Each of the former colonies receives varying 
amounts and forms of aid, which are related to specific circumstances in each country. 
Some of these states have similarities to Italy’s relationship with Libya, especially the 
willingness to work with controversial leaders. However, there are also clear differences, 
especially among economic cooperation and recognition of the colonial past.  Italy does 
not always recognize (or ever apologize for) damages caused by colonialism to any 
country other than Libya.  Migration is also a common theme seen throughout Italy’s 
relations with former colonies, but also to different extents. 
 Preference to particular former colonies has also varied since Italy lost control 
after the end of the Second World War based on opportunities they provided to Italian 
	   5 
politicians to pursue their goals in Italy (whether political or personal) or abroad.  
Throughout the Cold War, the Italian Christian Democrats and the Communist and 
Socialist parties fought for ideological control both within Italy, and provided aid and 
preferential treatment to particular former colonies based on their alliance with the West 
or the East. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the second Italian republic, 
the new political parties continued these patterns but with new and different political 
goals, one of the most prevalent being immigration control.   
 Migration first became a significant political issue in the mid-1980s.  In 1980, the 
total migrant population was at about 1,109,000 representing approximately 2% of the 
Italian population, 1,541 of which were asylum applications.4  However, by the early 
1990s, these numbers began to grow even more with 1,428,000 migrants in Italy and 
23,317 asylum applications lodged in 1991.5  These numbers continued to rise throughout 
the past decade, reaching 4,798,701 migrants in Italy by 2010 and 5,721,457 by 2013.6  
This increase in migration drastically shifted public and political discourse towards 
migration. In the 1990s, the majority of the migrants entering Italy were from the 
Balkans, and throughout this time Italian foreign policy reflected the need to control 
migration from the Balkans.  At the turn of the century, migration from Sub-Saharan 
countries began to drastically increase which is also when Italy began a series of bi-
lateral agreements with Libya.  Throughout the 2000s, Libya was the priority among 
former colonies, with minimal attention paid to the ongoing conflicts in the Horn of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “International Migrants by Country of Destination, 1960-2013,” Migration Policy Institute, 
 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/international-migrants-country-destination-
1960-2013?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true   
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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Africa.  However, after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the outbreak of civil war 
and Libya’s inability to enforce border controls, Italy’s focused shifted the providing aid 
to the Horn of Africa to combat migration into Italy. 
In this analysis, I will begin with a discussion of the Italian-Libyan relationship 
and show the profound preference given to Libya in Italian foreign policy, especially with 
the provision of aid and apologizing for colonial damages.  I will then discuss the 
potential factors that contribute to this preferential treatment, including the economic 
interdependence between the two countries and the unique personal relationship between 
Gaddafi and Berlusconi.  However, I argue that Libya’s status as a transit country for 
migrants entering Italy is the primary factor for special treatment.  I will also discuss 
Italy’s response to the Arab Spring and Libyan Civil War and show how migration is the 
primary factor driving Italian foreign policy. 
Next, I will show how each of Italy’s other former colonies (Albania, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Somalia) is approached with foreign policy.  Albania provides an interesting 
insight into how Italy first approach migration with foreign policy, as there were massive 
influxes of Albanians throughout the 1990s during the Balkan Wars.  Albania is 
comparable to Libya in the sense that it is also a transit country for migrants entering 
Italy by boat, although not to the same extent as Libya.  This has caused a relatively 
similar approach to Albania, however Albania did not have the same economic or 
personal ties as Libya which gave them a disadvantage in terms of receiving aid or 
recognition of their colonial ties.  I will also explain how the approach to the Horn of 
Africa has been relatively general until the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and how Italy 
shifted foreign policy approach in an effort to continue migration control.  Seeing as how 
	   7 
each of these states are significant countries of origin for migrants and asylum seekers 
entering Italy, Italian foreign policy towards these countries since the emergence of 
migration as a political issue can show how they did not provide as many opportunities 
for Italy to combat migration.  Italian foreign policy towards these states does resemble 
that with Libya, especially through showing a willingness to cooperate with a 
controversial leader and through lucrative economic and foreign aid agreements.  
However, they do not provide significant economic benefits and using a humanitarian aid 
approach towards combating migration in countries of origin is a long-term process 
compared to the immediate border controls imposed by Libya.   
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CHAPTER 2: SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITALY AND LIBYA 
 
Libya’s privileged position within Italian foreign policy is an extremely complex 
phenomenon with several competing factors.  Although former colonies from all 
European states typically receive a general privilege in terms of foreign aid and migration 
agreements, the relationship between Italy and Libya shows Libya’s preference among 
Italy’s former colonies and within all of Italian foreign policies.  Gaddafi’s outspoken 
nature, especially concerning damages from colonialism, and his friendship with Silvio 
Berlusconi surely contributed to the unique relationship.  Furthermore, investments in 
each other’s respective economies influenced the privileged relationship.  Ironically, this 
resulted in Italy’s richest former colony receiving the most foreign aid, despite 
widespread poverty and conflict in the other countries, especially in the Horn of Africa.  
However, I argue that Libya’s geographical location and situation as a transit country for 
migrants into Europe is what triggered the extreme foreign policy measures that 
apologized for colonialism and mass provision of aid.   
 
Gaddafi’s Personality  
 Following Libyan independence in 1951, the Italian government attempted to 
have relative diplomacy through bilateral agreements in 1956 and formed diplomatic 
relations with King Idriss.  However, after Gaddafi’s military coup in 1969, the new 
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leader initiated an extremely outspoken campaign against Italians and the damages they 
caused during colonialism.  Gaddafi immediately expelled over 20,000 Italians who had 
settled in Italy during colonialism.  All of their assets were confiscated and all companies, 
including Italian gas and oil companies, were nationalized under the Gaddafi regime.  
This aggression towards Italian colonialism culminated as Gaddafi declared October 7th 
and an official ‘day of vengeance against the Italians’ in 1970.  Gaddafi continuously 
denounced Italian colonialism, even throughout the recent negotiations and agreements 
with Italy.  When Gaddafi was invited to speak at the Italian Senate in 2009, he made a 
symbolic statement when he brought the son of the resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar who 
was executed by colonial authorities.7  Gaddafi himself also pinned a picture of the late 
Mukhtar to his jacket as a reminder of Italian colonial damages.8  This strong stance 
against Italian colonialism and outspoken approach to history is undoubtedly a factor in 
why Italy provided apologies for colonialism, especially considering leaders from other 
former colonies did not have as strong rhetoric and actions towards Italy.  However, the 
provisions of such an apology and amounts of foreign aid cannot simply be explained by 
Gaddafi’s demands, especially considering the collective lack of historical memory 
concerning colonialism throughout Italian society. 
 Furthermore, the privileged relationship and apologies for colonialism are often 
attributed to the close friendship between both controversial leaders, Gaddafi and 
Berlusconi.  This relationship has been criticized and sensationalized world wide, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “Colonel Gaddafi’s over here, Mr Berlusconi… Silvo is rather taken by Libyan leader’s honour guard,” 
Daily Mail, June 11, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1192117/Colonel-Gaddafis-Mr-
Berlusconi--Silvio-taken-Libyan-leaders-honour-guard.html  
 
8Nicola Chelotti and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “An Assessment of Italian-Libyan Relations,” in Italy’s 
Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century: A Contested Nature? Ed. Ludovica Marchi et al.  (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 188.	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especially after the heads of state had official visits to the respective countries.  
Criticisms of this relationship persisted in Italy as well, as Chelotti explains;  
“Gaddafi’s trip to Italy was condemned by the part of the opposition (DP) 
largely on the basis of its ostentation and colorful features.  In this vein, a 
more sober approach would have probably considered the decision to 
invite the Libyan leader to address the Italian Senate in 2009 
inappropriate; likewise, the decision to send the air force aerobatics team 
to Libya to join the 40th anniversary celebrations marking Gaddafi’s 
military coup was considered a sign of excessive deterrence and 
subservience to the Libyan leader.”9   
 
This extravagant meeting was also criticized worldwide, including from the Obama 
administration.  The White House Press Secretary explained how “Washington itself has 
since long re-established its relationship with Tripoli…but it manages it with great 
caution and, by consequence, does not understand the reasons why its Italian ally has let a 
notoriously unpredictable guest to dominate the national scene for ‘so many days.”10  
Berlusconi and Gaddafi both have unique and controversial forms of diplomacy, which 
undoubtedly influenced the drastic measures allotted to Libya within the Treaty of 
Friendship.   
Berlusconi’s speech upon the signing of the Treaty of Friendship exemplifies 
their unique friendship and the importance it played in the agreements.  He expressed 
how the Treaty on Friendship “will end 40 years of misunderstandings.  It is a complete 
and moral recognition of the damages which have been inflicted by Italy on Libya during 
the colonial period.”11  Furthermore;  
“Your leader wanted to end this period, all these long years in which our 
two countries have collaborated, yes, but have been divided in the memory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Chelotti and Johansson-Nougés, 186. 
 
10 Ferrari and Pejrao, 101.   
 
11 Ferrari and Pejrao, 102  
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of what happened in those years.  Your leader wanted us to look forward 
and build a friendship which could render our peoples happier, for 
everybody, but for and foremost for our young people.”12  
 
This speech shows a personal and direct appeal to the Libyan people in the name of 
Italian people, showing a typical populist attitude.13 Ferrari explains how;  
“The insistence on the semantic fields of “friendship” and “happiness”… 
are respectively responding, first, to a move away from foreign policy 
considerations in the direction of establishing informal as well as special 
personal relations (personalization and deinstitutionalization of politics); 
and, second, to a tendency to use emotional arguments and appeals in 
political speeches, which sometimes, whether directly or indirectly, recalls 
religious discourse.”    
 
Berlusconi and Gaddafi clearly had a unique friendship that influenced the 
controversial negotiations and Treaty on Friendship, however, Berlusconi was not 
the only Italian leader to provide special treatment to Libya and its leader, and this 
personal relationship cannot be the primary factor for the colonial apology and aid 
package. 
While both of their unconventional attitudes towards diplomacy and foreign 
policy undoubtedly influenced the negotiations, it is clear that Libya would have still 
received privileged treatment in terms of Italian foreign aid.  The initial rapprochement 
for the agreements occurred under Prodi’s and D’Alema’s governments and merely 
continued under Berlusconi’s center-right administrations.14  Both the center-left and 
center-right coalitions lobbied for ending the embargos against Libya within the United 
Nations and the European Union, which occurred in 2003 after a decision from the UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ferrari and Pejrano, 102. 
 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Chelotti and Johansson-Nogues 
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Security Council.15  Furthermore, the majority of the Italian-Libyan agreements were 
never discussed in Parliament and generally did not receive criticisms from any party or 
opposing coalitions.   
 Although Gaddafi’s charismatic and bold personality clearly influenced the 
negotiations with Italy, the special privilege given to Libya must also be examined within 
the other areas of interest within the Treaty on Friendship, especially with economic 
cooperation and measures aimed at preventing migration.  
 
Italian-Libyan Economic Cooperation 
 By the early 1980s, Italy and Libya were already economically intertwined 
despite political tensions. However, Pisano argues that the economic cooperation between 
the two countries was based on Libyan control over Italy’s energy needs.  By 1982, Libya 
controlled 15-17% of Italy’s energy needs.16  Furthermore, Libyan-Italian trade increased 
by $1.3 billion between 1977-1979, reaching $3.7 billion.17  However, the balance of 
trade favored Libya by $550 million.18  Pisano explains how “the economy’s need for 
Libyan markets, petroleum, and investments, and the governments concern for the safety 
of Italy’s labor force in Libya are the principal factors that account for the restraint in 
dealing with the various forms of intimidation perpetuated by the Tripoli regime.”19  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Vittorfanco S. Pisano, “Libya’s Foothold in Italy” in The Washington Quarterly (1981), 
doi:10.1080/01636608209477565.   
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid. 
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shows how although Italy held economic interests in the area, Libya held more power due 
to its oil and natural gas supply. 
 This situation became more controversial after the Libyan bombing of a German 
disco in 1986 and the implementation of an arms ban and economic sanctions on Libya.  
Although these embargos did not significantly harm the economy, lifting theses bans 
became a rallying point for Italian politicians within the European Union.  After 
significant negotiations under Prodi’s presidency of the European Council, the bans were 
lifted and Italy has been Libya’s largest supplier of arms since.20 
The Italian commitment towards lifting the economic sanctions from the EU and 
the UN show the importance of a strong Libyan economy for Italy.  The preamble of the 
Treaty on Friendship explicitly recognizes the Italian diplomacy’s contribution to the 
eventual decision to life the international embargo against Libya, which shows tribute to 
the countless Italian politicians and diplomats who relentlessly pursued this task, despite 
the fact that lifting international sanctions was highly unpopular at the time.21 
The mutual investments in the Italian and Libyan economies have also 
undoubtedly played a role in determining Libyan preference within Italian foreign policy.  
Italy is essentially dependent on Libya for energy imports, as Libya is the primary 
supplier of oil (30%) and the third greatest for natural gas (13%).22  In 2004 under an 
agreement between Gaddafi and Berlusconi, the Greenstream pipeline was created which 
served as a natural gas submarine pipeline from Libya to Italy with a capacity of 8 (later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Rachel Donadio, “Turmoil in Libya Poses Threat to Italy’s Economy,” in New York Times, March 6, 
2011, p. 10. 
 
21 Chelotti and Johansson-Nogues. 
 
22 Ibid. 
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increased to 11) billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.23  This accounts for 
approximately 10% of Italy’s daily oil demand.  
 Although there is a clear economic interdependence between Italy and Libya, this 
relationship is unique in the sense that Libya held control over Italy’s oil and energy 
sectors.  Italy’s other former colonies are some of the poorest countries in the world, so 
Libya does have a clear advantage in terms of economic cooperation.  However, this 
economic interdependence still does not fully explain why Italy would provide $5billion 
of colonial reparations to only its richest former colony. 
 
Libya as a Transit Country for Migration 
After the discovery of hydrocarbons in Libya in the 1950s and the development of 
the oil industry, economic migrants flocked to Libya for work. Gaddafi promoted this 
immigration into Libya by signing multiple bi-lateral and cooperation agreements with 
various African countries in order to utilize workers and to promote pan-Arab and pan-
African movements throughout the 1980s.  The Libyan government highly monitored 
incoming migrants and was able to direct them to areas that required labor.  Libya even 
recruited migrants to come work in Libya by placing advertisements in daily newspapers 
throughout Africa.  However, after accusations of Libyan involvement in shooting down 
the Lockerbie flight in 1988 and over Niger in 1992, the UN Security Council imposed 
air and arms embargoes, which relatively hurt the Libyan economy.   Although the 
sanctions and the oil recessions did not help the economy, the strong oil presence allowed 
the economy to stay relatively strong. It was in this context of a country heavily geared 
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towards migration that perpetuated the idea to travel beyond Libya to Europe which 
attracted a significant proportion of refugees and migrants.24    
Migrants and asylum-seekers from Sudan and the Horn of Africa, including 
Italy’s former colonies Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, typically enter Libya illegally in 
the south-eastern corner of Libya, in Kufra.  Reportedly between 10,000-12,000 people 
pass through Kufra every month and typically use it as a transit point to other cities in 
Libya.25  These migrants are typically dependent on smugglers who can demand large 
fees for their services, which brings them on the most common routes out of Kufra to 
Ajdabiya, to Benghazi, or to Tripoli.26 Once arriving in a major coastal town, migrants 
must then prepare to cross the Mediterranean Sea, most often from Benghazi or Tripoli, 
but also from the smaller towns of Zuwarrah and Zlitan.27 
 Libya has over 4,000km of land borders with Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, 
Sudan and Egypt that provides a path for migration.  While some citizens of neighboring 
states have the legal right of entry, others and those migrating from greater distances 
typically take longer and more dangerous journeys.  Two common points of entry were at 
the border with Sudan and Libya and Chad and Libya.  However, in May 2003 the border 
crossing at Sudan was closed after Italy and Libya signed a Cultural, Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation Agreement on May 6 that emphasized the cooperation 
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concerning “science of the earth and of the sea.”28  This agreement resulted in what 
Torressi defines as “regulatory regionalism” where by providing “scientific and 
technological assistance,” Italy is essentially externalizing border control practices.29  
 Furthermore, following the cooperation agreements between Italy and Libya in 
the early 2000s, the Italian government began carrying out a series of mass deportations 
upon arrival of large influxes of foreign nationals.30  These diplomatic agreements 
include; to fight terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration 
(2000); the establishment of a permanent liaison on organized crime and illegal 
immigration involving collaboration with Italian police officers (2003), and provisions of 
training and equipment to Libya, in particular to assist in border surveillance and 
management.31 These funds also contributed to building detention centers for illegal 
immigrants at points of entrance, including in Kufra.  These agreements also allowed 
Italy to begin deporting migrants back to Libya, regardless of their country of origin and 
without access to the asylum process, solely based on their illegal entrance into the 
country.  The Italian government was clearly willing to take these steps which violated 
multiple international human rights agreements, as they deported thousands of foreign 
nationals in 2004-2005.  Within one week in October of 2004, 1,787 migrants arrived in 
Lampedusa and of them, 1,153 were readmitted to Libya in 11 charter flights of 
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commercial and military planes.32  After another massive influx between 13 and 21 
March 2005 with 1,235 foreign nationals, the Italian government sent 494 back to Libya 
and another 76 directly to Egypt. 
However, the most extreme preferential treatment and apologies for colonialism 
culminated with the Treaty on Friendship of 2008.  The Treaty on Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation between Italy exemplifies how Italy used its colonial 
history to combat migration, by justifying sending aid and clearly giving preferential 
treatment to Libya compared to its other colonies as it is a transit country for migration.  
The preamble of the treaty expresses how the two countries are “finally closing the 
painful chapter of the past…Italy has the deepest regret for the suffering of the Libyan 
people following Italian colonization.”33 A content analysis of the preamble of the Treaty 
on Friendship explains how “the treaty pushed the bilateral relations between both sides 
into a new era, and consequently, the preamble included such words as partnership 
(7.90%), friendship (5.26%), willingness (5.26%), and closing of the past hostilities 
(2.63%).”34 Although the word “apology” is only mentioned one in the entirety of the 
document (in the preamble), its effects extend beyond the quantitative dimension.35  
Berlusconi further apologized upon signing the document in Benghazi when he expressed 
his regret; “In the name of the Italian people, as head of the government, I feel it my duty 
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to apologize and express my sorrow for what happened many years ago and left a scar on 
many of your families.”36   
 In addition to the goal of ending historical disputes and to establish an equal and 
new partnership, the Treaty included agreements to help build infrastructure, it created a 
social fund, and committed to fight terrorism, organized crimes and illegal immigration.37  
However, when referring to “historical disputes” many Italian colonial scholars have 
noted how the Treaty never specifically mentions any abuses.  Furthermore, rhetoric 
about their colonial past “alludes to Italian regret for past colonial abuses, and to 
settlement of colonial-era disputes, but only to declare them now settled and resolved.  
The words ‘close’ and ‘closure’ recur every time mention is made to the colonial past.”38 
This pattern is not unique to Libya, and when Italy does reference the colonial history 
(even with the other colonies) it is always distancing itself from abuses rather taking 
responsibility.  However, the nature of the reparations for colonialism bring more insight 
into why Libya received such preferential treatment in terms of colonial apologies and 
foreign aid.   
Although this agreement is based on reparations from Italian colonialism, it is 
clear that many of the stipulations have restricted the ability for any African citizens to 
seek asylum or to immigrate into Italy through Libya.  These measures included mixed 
sea, aerial and land patrols for the direct participation of the Italian government in the 
repatriation of migrants arriving in Libya, mostly from Egypt, Pakistan, Ghana and 	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Nigeria.39  These “reparations for colonialism” had a significant impact on the amount of 
migrants and asylum seekers entering Italy, showing the relative success of the goals of 
Italian politicians.  The amount of migrants who successfully made the journey across the 
Mediterranean, specifically along the Central Mediterranean Sea Route, shows the vast 
impact of the agreements.  In 2008, almost 40,000 were detected using this route and 
were primarily from Somalia, Eritrea, Tunisia, and Nigeria.40 However, this migration 
patterns almost stopped completely in 2009 after Italy and Libya signed the Treaty for 
Friendship, with only 4,500 migrants detected.  After the Arab Spring and outbreak of 
civil war in Libya, the numbers increased again as the Libyan state lost control and did 
not maintain border security to prevent transit migrants, reaching 64,300 in 2011 and 
170,760 in 2014.41 
 These agreements violated numerous human rights agreements that Italy has 
previously signed, including the Geneva Convention.  The Geneva Convention outlined 
the rights of refugees and stipulated that a refugee could not be returned to a state where 
he or she fears persecution.42  Furthermore, Italy is required to abide by the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees certain rights concerning refugees 
including asylum, education, work, health care, residence, respect for cultural diversity 
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and the right to a fair trail, among others.43  The Treaty on Friendship infringed upon 
these rights, primarily through the principle of refoulement and preventative push-backs.  
Although the Italian military is limited to acting within their own territory, including 
nautical borders, this agreement allowed the Italian navy to patrol the Libyan coast and 
return migrants who would have made the journey through the Mediterranean and had 
legitimate claims for asylum. 
 
Libyan Civil War 
 The outbreak of the Libyan civil war has forced the Italian Foreign Ministry to 
take a different approach with foreign policy towards Libya, although there is still a clear 
emphasis on combatting migration into Italy.  Since the Arab Spring and the subsequent 
Civil War, Italy initially attempted to promote foreign policy for a stable Libyan state.  
Italy continued to emphasize its “friendship” and commitment to cooperate with Libya, 
and their shared history.  However, as the Libyan state has continued to dissolve and 
more conflict has developed, it has not been able to maintain and enforce the border 
agreements from the Treaty on Friendship and Italy has shifted its foreign policy 
concerning migration to countries of origin.   
 Italy was initially reluctant to condemn to Gaddafi regime, further showing the 
importance of this personal relationship to Silvio Berlusconi.  Riots broke out on 
February 17, 2011 and on February 19, Berlusconi reported that he has not spoken with 
Gaddafi because he did not want to “disturb” him.44  However, by February 21, 
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Berlusconi broke his silence on the situation and called the violence “unacceptable.”45 On 
February 23, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini condemned the attacks further and to a 
greater extent as he explained, “We are in a grave, most grave, situation whose tragic 
outcome will be a bloodbath.”46  However, the majority of his statement focused on the 
potential migration flows into Italy, calling for support from the European Union.  A 
press release from the Foreign Ministry states, “As regards the migration emergency 
caused by the crisis in North Africa, Frattini said that ‘The European Union, acting 
through Frontex, must assume control of the management of the flows of migrants who 
could arrive on Italian shores.”47  By not addressing the violence from Gaddafi, the Italian 
government further showed how their priority and greatest concern was migration. 
 Even after the fall of Gaddafi, Italian foreign policy continued to emphasize their 
“friendship” with the Libyan people.  Foreign Minister Franco Frattini announced that 
“In Libya, by virtue of our past and recent history, we were more exposed than others to 
the uncertainties raised by regime change.  Yet I believe we have managed to stay in the 
front line, in both diplomatic and military terms, in the international coalition and to 
position ourselves for a role of leading player in the post-Gaddafi era.”48 Gaddafi’s 
personal relationship was not the primary factor in Libya’s preferential treatment, as Italy 	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continued its commitment to the Libyan people after his government fell and after his 
death.  Frattini went on to explain how;  
“We were one of the first countries to recognize the new representatives of 
the Libyan people, install a diplomatic presence in Benghazi and send an 
Ambassador to the new Tripoli…The aim is to reactivate the Italian-
Libyan Friendship Treaty: an instrument that underscores and preserves 
Italy’s unique position in the country.”49 
 
This clearly shows that Italy was fully committed to maintaining this relationship 
with the new Libyan government and to continuing the Treaty on Friendship, 
especially the measures towards combatting migration.     
 However, migration into Italy drastically increased after the Arab Spring and the 
fall of Gaddafi.  In 2010, only 4,406 irregular migrants arrived in Italy by sea, which is a 
direct cause of the Italian-Libyan agreements.50  In 2011, 42,807 irregular migrants 
arrived in Italy by sea due to the political instability in the region and widespread 
violence.51 This amount of migrants would not have been able to enter Italy had Gaddafi 
continued to enforce land and sea borders, as stipulated in the various bilateral 
agreements.   
This drastic increase must also be taken into context with the Hirisi v. Jaama case 
heard by the European Court of Human Rights. A group of eleven Somali nationals and 
thirteen Eritrean nationals brought the case after being returned to Libya after being 
intercepted by Italian Revenue Police and the Coast Guard.  The claimants were not 
informed of their destinations, there was no attempt to identify the individuals, and all of 	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their documents and personal belongings were confiscated.52  The Italian Minister of the 
Interior clearly expressed how this was the goal of Italian-Libyan bilateral agreements 
stating that the operation to intercept vessels on the high seas and to push the migrants 
back to Libya represented an important turning point in the fight against clandestine 
immigration.53  As of 2009, more than 461 irregular migrants had been intercepted and 
transferred to Libya based on these agreements through a series of nine operations.54  The 
applicants argued “that the decision to push back to Libya clandestine migrants 
intercepted on the high seas was a genuine political choice on the part of Italy, aimed at 
giving the police the main responsibility for controlling illegal immigration, in disregard 
of the protection of the fundamental rights of the people concerned.”55  The Court found 
that Italy had violated the European Convention on Human Rights and the Geneva 
Convention, and the non-refoulement principle within the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.  Transferring the applicants had been carried out without any 
examination of each individual situation and there was no attempt at identification. The 
Court also ruled that;  
“Italy cannot evade its own responsibility by relying on its obligations 
arising out of bilateral agreements with Libya.  Even if it were to be 
assumed that those agreements made express provision for the return to 
Libya of migrants intercepted on the high seas, the Contracting States’ 
responsibility continues even after their having entered into treaty 
commitments subsequent to the entry force of the Convention.”56 
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These rulings cannot be separated from the drastic increase in irregular migrants 
arriving in Italy between 2010, in addition to the influx resulting from the Arab 
Spring movements.  After the Court’s ruling, Italy could no longer use these sorts 
of actions which gave migrants a greater opportunity to enter Italy and caused 
immigration to become an even more significant political issue.   
 As the Libyan state lost control and massive influxes of migrants entered Italy, 
there is a clear shift in Italian foreign policy to addressing migration through the countries 
of origin with humanitarian assistance.  Many of these countries are also former Italian 
colonies, including Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.  Although these states are now 
receiving preferential treatment within Italian foreign policy due to their historical 
relationship, they do not receive as much foreign aid or apologies for colonial damages as 
Libya because this approach does not provide as great of an opportunity to immediately 
and drastically effect migration patterns.     
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CHAPTER 3: ITALY AND ALBANIA 
 
 Italy’s diplomatic relations with Albania highlight the importance of migration in 
foreign policy.  Since the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, Italy has been 
involved in many bi-lateral and multi-lateral efforts that had the goal of preventing 
migration from Albania.  However, the amount and quality of aid is incomparable to that 
provided to Libya as Albania.  Italy’s relationship with Albania can provide insights into 
its approach to Libya and the Horn of Africa, as Albania is both a transit country for 
migrants and a significant country of origin.  Although the amount of migrants using 
Albania as a transit country is much less than those through Libya, there is a clear 
emphasis on border controls and a relatively preferential treatment in bilateral 
agreements.  Furthermore, the efforts to stabilize the country are similar to those within 
the Horn of Africa.  However, more attention is given to border control, further showing 
Italy’s concern with preventing migration with the greatest and most immediate effect. 
Italy has collectively signed over thirty agreements and treaties with Albania 
since 1957.  These agreements cover many areas, including issues related to 
transportation, economic issues, and increased cooperation to combat crime (including 
combatting migration and police cooperation).  Although Italian foreign policy towards 
Albania covers many areas, it is clear that preventing migration into Italy was a primary 
concern.   
	   26 
 Albania has consistently been a country of origin for many migrants entering 
Italy.  The initial influx of Albanians into Italy is undoubtedly related to the outbreak of 
war in the Balkans in the early 1990s and the collapse of the Albanian political system.  
After the fall of communism in 1991, an estimated 40,000 Albanians entered Italy, and 
Italy declared a state of emergency to deal with the Albanian migrants.57 They created the 
position of Minister of Emigration and Immigration and passed the Martelli Law, which 
set new procedures for immigration.58  Of the Albanians in Italy at the end of October 
1991, only 645 obtained political refugee status (of 17,718 applicants), 2,715 were sent 
back, 315 were expelled, 9,451 found jobs, 711 found vocational training courses, and 
approximately 8,000 had not found jobs and became illegal immigrants under the new 
law.59  In response to this “crisis,” Italy also initiated a series of bilateral agreements 
between 1991-1993, which consisted primarily of emergency aid, humanitarian 
assistance, assistance for the establishment and strengthening of institutions and 
liberalization processes at the beginning of the democratic transition (1993-1997).60  
Albanian and Italian delegations agreed on a three-year Development Plan that amounted 
to 218.5 billion liras with initiatives in infrastructure, agriculture, construction, 
institutional development and four special working groups to develop cooperation 
strategies in the sectors of development, economy, culture and immigration.61 
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Despite the Italian agreements that promoted a stable Albanian economy, in 1997 
Albania faced great instability as the economy collapsed due to a series of failed get-rich 
quick pyramid investment schemes supported by the first democratically elected 
President, Sali Berisha.  This economic collapse shows the failure of Italian agreements 
and the lack of a strong Italian commitment towards genuinely strengthening the 
Albanian economy after 1991.   
At the time, Albania was Europe’s poorest country and the failed investment 
caused as much as $1 billion of personal savings to be lost.62  The fact that Albania was 
Europe’s poorest country could further contribute to the lack of commitment for 
economic cooperation, especially when compared to Libya who was one of Africa’s 
richest states and was by far the richest of Italy’s former colonies.  Albania did not have 
financial investments in Italy, and although the bilateral agreements attempted to increase 
Albanian imports and Italian foreign direct investment in Albania, these negotiations and 
economic partnerships did not begin until after the mass influx of Albanians into Italy.   
 This economic and political crisis caused thousands of Albanians to migrate to 
Italy.  Around 12,000 Albanians arrived just between March 13 and March 24, 1997 
adding to the estimated 64,000 Albanians legally living in Italy and another 200,000 
illegally in Italy.63  It is likely that over 16,000 refugees from Albania were residing in 
Italy by the end of April 1997.64  The Italian authorities did not want to grant Albanians 
political asylum, as they considered Albania to be a case of “degeneration of public 
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order” rather than a political situation.65  Italy was committed to repatriating Albanians 
without proper entry papers who were seeking political asylum, despite calls from the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty International to grant temporary status 
for Albanians in Italy.66 At this time, the Italian political debate framed immigration as a 
problem of responsibility, and policies mainly consisted of a non-compulsory quota 
system on the basis of economic needs and possibilities of the Italian welfare state.67  
Albanians clearly fell under the target group who would be eligible for immigration or 
asylum in Italy, but the Italian state was not economically prepared for this influx.   
 Furthermore, Italian foreign policy began to reflect the desire to keep Albanian 
migrants out of Italy.  Italy requested and received a UN mandate to lead a ‘coalition of 
the willing’ into Albania, after identifying Albania as a regional threat.  Italy became a 
leader in the situation and assembled the multilateral peacekeeping forces dubbed 
Operation Alba to restore order and distribute humanitarian aid. Italy also lead the 
“Allied Harbor” operation, which housed, fed, and provided medical care to the refugees 
in Albania from Kosovo.  However, Davison argues that this mission is an example 
where national interests of deferring refugees were more important than the humanitarian 
rhetoric.68   
 In response to the collapsed economic system in Albania, Italy did initiate another 
series of bilateral agreements.  The agreements signed in December 1997 included 	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negotiations regarding “the immediate humanitarian aid to enrich the lives of those who 
try to leave Albania” which is clearly using humanitarian rhetoric to combat migration,69 
and the first police cooperation agreement signed by Italy.  Police cooperation 
agreements have allowed Italy to expel entire groups of migrants from Italian territory, 
who are loaded up and returned to wherever they came from.70  In order to fully 
implement these agreements, Italy has offered limited legal immigration opportunities 
from cooperation countries, development cooperation, technical assistance, financial 
assistance and training programs.71  Italy has signed police cooperation agreements with 
the majority of countries that provide a transit route into Italy, including all of the 
Northern African countries.  
Albania did receive a relatively high amount of spaces allotted through the 
Annual Immigration Quotas put in place by the Turco-Napolitano law of 1998.  When the 
quotas were first initiated, only three countries received legal immigration allotments; 
Albania, Tunisia, and Morocco.  In 1998, Albania had 3,000 while Tunisia and Morocco 
each had 1,500.72  In 1999 the quota for Albania raised to 4000 and by 2000 to 6,000.73 
Cuttitta attributes this allotment to the fact that Albania was the main country of origin of 
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immigrants throughout the 1990s and that Albania was the first country to sign a 
readmission agreement with Italy, as early as 1997.74  
Furthermore, there is no clear sign of a personal relationship between Italian and 
Albanian leaders that has been utilized to prevent migration.  This is partially due to the 
instable nature of the Albanian government, which saw high turnover in the early 1990s.  
Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha and Silvio Berlusconi showed typical diplomacy, 
as they assured “excellent relations between Italy and Albania” in 2010.75  Berlusconi did 
address migration when he claimed “we do not want any more Albanians dying in the 
Otranto Straight or influxes of criminals into Italy.”76 Berlusconi did not make any sort of 
comments about the Prime Minister Berisha specifically, as did so often with Gaddafi.  
This lack of a personal relationships can also be seen through the lack of mention of 
Italy’s colonial history with Albania. 
Although Italy had historical ties to the Balkans from their invasion during the 
Second World War, there was no mention of this relationship in Italy’s foreign policy, 
which was clearly designed to prevent migration from the Balkans, especially from 
Albania. In 1995, just two years before Operation Alba, Italy and Albania signed a 
“Treaty for Friendship and Collaboration.”  Similarly to the Treaty on Friendship with 
Libya in 2008, the Treaty on Friendship with Albania focuses on economic development 
and cooperation, security, and combatting illegal migration.  Article 19 of the Treaty for 
Friendship with Albania stresses how an important issue that must be taken as a priority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Cuttitta, 42. 
 
75 “Berlusconi incontra Sali Berisha,” Governo Italiano, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (February 
12, 2010) http://www.governo.it/Notizie/Palazzo%20Chigi/dettaglio.asp?d=55381  
 
76 “Trattato di Amicizia e Collaborazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Republica di Albania”  Archivo dei 
Trattati internazionali Online (October 13, 1995). 
	   31 
is the influx of migrants, and that both countries must work to create regulations and 
groups to combat this problem.  However, there is only minimal reference to the 
historical relationship between Italy and Albania.  The Treaty refers to how Italy and 
Albania are “moved by the geographical proximity and the traditional constraints of 
friendship between the two countries.”77 Although this brief reference acknowledges 
tensions between the two countries, there is no sense of apology that was later provided 
to Libya. 
When compared to Libya, Albania historically has more migrants entering Italy as 
it is a country of origin (and transit) while Libya has been primarily a transit country for 
migration and only becoming a country of origin after the Arab Spring.  This fact caused 
Italy to use different approaches to combat migration, by attempting to strengthen the 
economy and provide jobs in Albania so they would not have a justification to leave.  
Furthermore, Albania does not provide Italy with as significant economic opportunities, 
and although Italy has shown a commitment to strengthening the Albanian economy and 
Italy has increased investments in Albania, the economic cooperation is incomparable to 
that of Libya. Albania did not receive as much preferential treatment in Italian foreign 
policy, despite the fact that both are former colonies and that migration is the primary 
basis of both relationships.  This is due to the fact that Albania did not provide as great or 
immediate effect on preventing migration, as they did not have the resources or authority 
as Libya and did not serve as a transit country for as many that travelled through Libya.   
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CHAPTER 4: ITALY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA 
 
Italy’s former colonies in the Horn of Africa have received relative preferential 
treatment within Italian foreign policy, primarily in the form of humanitarian aid. 
However, the amounts of foreign aid is incomparable to that provided to Libya.  Since the 
aid for Libya is justified on reparations for colonial damages, why is it that Italy did not 
make any sort of significant apologies for colonial harm in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Somalia?  This phenomenon is even more alarming when considering the widespread 
harm caused by Italians throughout the region, and the fact that the countries in the Horn 
of Africa are some of the poorest in the world and, arguably, should be provided with 
more foreign aid.   
 One of the most obvious explanations for this disparity is the fact that Somalia, 
Ethiopia, and Eritrea provide very limited economic opportunities for the Italian economy 
and they do not have significant influence or control over Italy’s oil and energy needs.   
Another possibility to explain this situation is that the leaders of these respective 
countries did not have a comparable level of personal ties in the Italian government or 
outspoken, demanding personality as Gaddafi.  While this statement is true to various 
extents among Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, it still does not fully explain the extreme 
preferential treatment provided to Libya among Italy’s former colonies.  I maintain that 
	   33 
Libya’s geography as a transit country for migration is the primary factor for the clear 
special treatment in Italian foreign policy.   
 Libya is a country of transit for migrants and asylum seekers from each of these 
states.  IOM has identified the “East Africa route,” which is typically followed by 
Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali migrants and asylum seekers. Migrants and 
asylum seekers from these countries meet in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, where they move 
to Khartoum and change smugglers to make the final leg of the journey (4 to 10 days in 
the Sahara desert) into Kufra, Libya.  Hamood explains how “While women originating 
from Sudan and Egypt tend not to travel to Libya, women form a considerable proportion 
of arrivals originating from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.  These women include: young, 
unmarried women traveling alone; and more often married women, frequently traveling 
with young children or in varying stages of pregnancy.”78  Even though the Treaty on 
Friendship’s aim is to make reparations from colonialism, it clearly created a more 
difficult situation for many citizens of Italy’s other former colonies who were attempting 
to migrate or seek asylum in Europe. 
Before examining Italy’s relationship with the individual countries, it is important 
to acknowledge how Italy’s approach to the region has been quite general.  There is a 
clear reluctance to become involved with resolving the conflicts in the region, which is 
even more ironic as many of the conflicts are directly linked to Italian colonialism.79 
Although these countries faced some of the greatest contemporary humanitarian disasters 
and extreme levels of poverty, Italy has not shown a full commitment to addressing these 	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concerns.  In terms of migration, it could be argued that Italy’s relative apathy towards 
living conditions in the Horn of Africa shows how preventing migration was not Italy’s 
primary concern with the agreements with Libya.  However, Italy’s approach to 
preventing migration in foreign policy must also be examined within how migration was 
framed domestically in terms of security.   
In the early 2000s when Libya and Italy were creating their extensive agreements, 
the political discourse framed immigration control as an internal security emergency.80  
This idea is clearly reflected in the controversial Bossi-Fini Act that passed in 2002, 
which abandoned the employment sponsorship program, required residency permits get 
renewed every two years instead of five, and linked residency permits to work permits.81  
It also expanded migrant detention centers by requiring all incoming migrants to be 
detained for up to sixty days, although many migrants are now required to stay longer.  
Illegal immigration as well as aiding an illegal immigrant became criminalized. Policy 
and political rhetoric was not focused on the living conditions of migrants in Italy, but on 
how to keep them out and send them back.  Similarly, Italian foreign policy was not 
focused on improving the lives of potential migrants to prevent migration but on how to 
keep them from entering Italy in the first place.   
Before the Arab Spring and the Libyan Civil War, Italy was assured that their 
agreements would be held and the investments would continue towards their designated 
purposes.  However, after the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the growing instability in 
Libya, Italy did finally take steps to address the living conditions in the Horn of Africa.  	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The timing of these efforts is key to seeing how preventing migration is the top priority.  
It was not until the collapse of the Libyan state, and the subsequent lack of confidence for 
Libya to enforce the agreements, that Italy started to specifically address the Horn of 
Africa.  These recent initiatives specifically emphasize the need to encourage 
development and cooperation to help the Italian migration problem.  The colonial history 
is often mentioned, although none are provided with apologies comparable to that 
received by Libya in 2008.   
Between July and December of 2014, Italy held the Presidency of the European 
Council, which gave it a leadership position to promote policies on the European level.  
In terms of foreign policy, Italy used this leadership role to initiate the first formal 
dialogue between the European Union and the Horn of Africa.  Italian Foreign Minister 
Paolo Gentiloni took initial steps for the agreement, which consists of the 28 countries of 
the European Union, Switzerland and Norway, and 27 African countries.82  The 
agreement, entitled the “Rome Declaration” is based of the Rabat Process initiated in 
2006 and it corresponds with a 4-pillar global and multi-dimensional strategy: legal 
migration/mobility; irregular migration and measures to combat the organized crime 
related to it; the migration-development linkage; and international protection.83 These 
actions clearly show the importance of preventing migration into Italy.  However, 
Foreign Minister Gentiolini also emphasized how “immigration is not just a matter of 
humanitarian initiatives and border controls.  It also involves economic cooperation with 	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the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean.”84 Interestingly, Libya was the 
only one of Italy’s former colonies to sign the agreement, which could strengthen the 
argument that Italy’s economic ties were the primary factor in showing preferential 
treatment in terms of foreign aid and apologies for colonialism to Libya.  However, many 
other factors must be considered with the Rome Declaration.  First, Libya was (and 
continuous to be) in civil war, which is at least partially driven by control of oil that 
affects Italian investments in Libya.  However, the act of signing an agreement during 
civil war is not representative of the country and cannot be fully enforced.  Second, this 
agreement also includes twenty-seven other partner countries, so there is no specific 
preferential treatment shown towards Libya. 
 Although Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia were not signatories in the Rome 
Declaration, Italy initiated another conference addressing migration specifically in the 
Horn of Africa through the “Khartoum Process.”  The twenty-eight EU members, with 
Norway and Switzerland, signed the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative with 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, and Tunisia on 
November 28th, 2014.  The agreement emphasizes more humanitarian aspects of 
immigration, especially involving human trafficking, the hazardous journeys across 
desert and the Mediterranean, and the importance of prosecuting smugglers and 
traffickers.85  However, the agreement does not provide any significant sources of aid and 
primarily promotes methods already in places, such as; developing cooperation at 
bilateral and regional level between countries of origin, transit and destination; assisting 	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in improving national capacity building in the field of migration management in all its 
components upon individual request of the countries in the region; and assisting in 
establishing and managing reception centers.86  These actions do represent a shift in a 
more multi-lateral and humanitarian approach to migration in the countries of origin 
(rather than Libya as a transit country), but there still is not as much actual support for 
these states.   Furthermore, the fact that this approach was not taken until after the fall of 
Gaddafi’s regime shows that Italy is still concerned with migration but it can no longer 
rely on the strict enforcement of border controls at the Libyan border so it has shifted to 
an approach with the countries of origin.  Although these countries are also former 
colonies in need of aid, Italy did not provide the same apologies for colonialism and 
amount of resources, as they do not have as much power over controlling migration.   
	  
Somalia 
Following the Second World War and the institutionalization of humanitarian aid, 
Somalia received special treatment among Italian foreign aid and development, which is 
undoubtedly due to its status as an Italian protectorate.  When Somalia officially became 
an independent state in 1960, it was one of the poorest countries in the world.  However, 
Italy did create a series of agreements in 1960 with Somalia in terms of technical 
assistance, development plans in health, education, public administration and justice 
fields, and even a “Treaty of Friendship.”  Although Italy later used treaties with this type 
of language to apologize for harms caused during colonialism, this treaty does not show 
any sort of recognition of colonial damages.  Following Somali independence, the new 	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Somali government requested the continuance of Italian aid through 1974, and continued 
to be one of the main recipients.    However, Toscone maintains that despite Italian 
efforts in Somalia, “Italian development cooperation policy was rather a function of the 
Atlantic and neo-Atlantic policy of the country, than the result of a deep understanding of 
the need to respond to the requests of the newly independent countries.”87  However, after 
Somalia became independent and merged with British Somalia, Somalia continued to be 
the main beneficiary of Italian aid throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
The preference accorded to Somalia reflects the conflicting party dynamics within 
Italy, who were competing (both domestically and abroad) to promote capitalism or 
communism during the Cold War.88  This externalization of internal political issues also 
reflects the current special treatment provided to Libya to prevent migration.  The 
preferential treatment with Somalia also resembled the relationship with Libya in the 
sense of close personal relationships between controversial leaders, PSI leader Benito 
Craxi and Somali leader Siyad Barre.  After Siyad Barre’s revolution and the launch of 
‘scientific socialism,’ the PSI increased cooperation with Somalia whenever possible. In 
1978 a series of meetings between the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) 
youth organization and PSI leadership, including Martelli and Craxi, met in both Rome 
and Mogadishu and reinforced cooperation between the two countries.89  Tripodi 
describes how “when Siyad Barre visited Rome on 11 September 1978 he received the 
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warmest welcome from the President of the Republic, the socialist Alessandro Pertini.”90  
This situation resembles when Gaddafi received such a welcome from Berlusconi upon 
his first trip to Rome in 2007.  Furthermore, after Barre’s visit to Rome, an autonomous 
budget was created for cooperation with Third World countries, and Somalia was the 
primary recipient of this fund.91  Between 1981 and 1983, Italy channeled over 220 
billion lire to Somalia and gave $63 million for its balance of payments deficit.92  The 
Italian commitment in Somalia significantly grew for many years following this meeting 
and a considerable amount of money was devoted to corruption with the dictator.93 
In contrast to Berlusconi’s friendship with Gaddafi, there was minimal resistance 
or criticisms concerning the Italian support of Siyad Barre’s repressive regime that 
openly violated human rights.  Despite concerns of Italian funds (that were intended to be 
used specifically to defeat starvation) being openly spent to support slave labor, the 
Italian commitment to Somalia continued.  In a stereotypical Italian fashion, the majority 
of funds intended for aid and economic development, including the Italian-Somali 
Chamber of Commerce, ended up being channeled through clientelistic relationships in 
both countries and supporting corruption.  Tripodi explains how “The Somali and Italian 
representatives reached an agreement that for any deal realized they would share 10 
percent of the entire business.  The projects supported by the Chamber of Commerce 
were funded by the FAI or by Cooperation for Development and they were often 
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completely useless.”94  This shows how economic cooperation was a factor in Somalia’s 
preferential treatment, but for corrupt, personal gains.  Although the political elite who 
benefitted from these agreements were able to provide preference to the cooperating 
Somali officials, the Somali economy did not have a significant hold over Italy as Libya 
does with oil and energy.   
 However, diplomatic relations between Italy and Somalia ended in 1991 after the 
escalating violence perpetuated by Siyad Barre and the murder of the Bishop of Somalia 
and an Italian scientist.  Italy did not have any formal agreements with Somalia between 
1990-2011, which further shows how the friendship was primarily out of convenience in 
the moment.  Another explanation for the end of this relationship is how Somalia served 
as a battle ground for influence between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the 
Christian Democrats (DC).  After the end of the Cold War both of these political parties 
dissolved due to mass corruption scandals.  However, the new political parties did not re-
establish formal relations with Somalia until 2011 when Italy opened an Italian Embassy 
in Mogadishu.95   Somalia was on Italy’s foreign policy agenda, but they were primarily 
motivated through multi-lateral agencies and did not take any leadership position in the 
multiple crisises, as they did with Libya.  Giulio Terzi explains how;  
“When Italy was in the UN Security Council, in the mid-90s, each time we 
tried to bring the Somalia dossier to the Council’s attention (the memory 
of the tragic end of the American mission was still fresh) we came up 
against opposition from a whole range of countries.  To the extent that we 
renamed Somalia ‘The forgotten country’: a black hole in the UN’s 
geopolitics vis-à-vis East Africa.  I think that establishing and managing 	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that priority has been, as it was back then, a success for Italian diplomacy.  
Sadly, however, it wasn’t enough to find a way out of a crisis that has 
become endemic.”96   
 
Despite Italy’s claims of calling for more support in Somalia, they also did not take any 
significant actions for the crisis in Somalia.   
  The timing for reestablishing a formal Italian presence in Somalia was justified 
by the promises of the transitional government after the state had essentially been in civil 
war since the ousting of Siyad Barre in 1991.  However, this was not the first attempt in 
Somalia to establish a legitimate government since the civil war, it was only the first time 
it was backed by the international community.  The Transitional Charter of the Somali 
Republic that established the transitional institutions and roles of the government in 2004, 
the fourteenth attempt to establish a government since 1991, did not receive international 
support due to the general instability in Somalia.  However, before receiving international 
backing in 2011, similar concerns persisted.  According to the International Crisis Group 
in 2011,  
“So far, every effort to make the administration modestly functional has 
come unstuck. The new leaner cabinet looks impressive on paper but, 
given divisive politics and the short timeframe, is unlikely to deliver 
significant progress on key transitional objectives, such as stabilizing 
Somalia and delivering a permanent constitution before August 2011, 
when the TFG’s official mandate ends.”97   
 
Why was the international community, and specifically Italy, willing to support the TFG 
under the same previous circumstances in 2011 but not throughout the previous decade? 
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 Although there are many competing factors for this support, it cannot be separated 
from the increase of Somali migrants and asylum seekers into Italy and the collapse of 
the Libyan state ,which previously enforced border controls for Somali asylum seekers 
attempting to reach Italy.  In 2000, the total population from Somalia in Italy was only 
160 persons, which began to drastically increase in 2004 when there were 598 refugees 
and asylum seekers from Somalia.  The number of asylum seekers further increased in 
2006 after the Ethiopian military intervention and the subsequent insurgency that 
opposed Ethiopia opened up a new period of violence and political instability in the 
country.98 By 2008, there were a reported 5,251 people from Somalia with rates 
increasing every year to 7,747 in 2009, 7924 in 2010, 8497 in 2011, 9778 in 2012, and 
12,170 in 2013.99 Somalia is clearly a current concern within Italian foreign policy, 
however Somalia has not received as much aid or any colonial apology as provided to 
Libya.  This is due to the fact that Somalia does not have the capacity to immediately 
effect migration to the same extent as Libya. 
 
 
Ethiopia 
 
The Italian relationship with Ethiopia in terms of preferential treatment is 
relatively similar to that of Somalia.  Just as the PCI and PSI supported communist 
movements in Somalia, the Christian Democrats supported Ethiopia and their Western 
alignment during the Cold War.  Immediately following the war, Ethiopia sided with the 
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West and went to the United States for their security needs.  This alignment followed the 
ideology of the Emperor Haile Selassie who was outspoken about the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia.  By the end of the Second World War, Selassie was living in exile in England 
but he was restored to his position after the Italians lost the war.  Ethiopia associated 
itself with capitalism and Western thinking; thus formed stronger relationships with the 
United States and subsequently the new Italian republic governed by the Christian-
Democrats.  Ironically, Somalia and Ethiopia had continuous border disputes throughout 
this time and the different Italian factions were essentially supporting both sides of the 
conflict.  This  behavior of supporting both sides of a conflict to promote domestic 
political concerns persists throughout Italian foreign policy.  Throughout the Cold War, 
ideology was the primary concern while the contemporary issue is migration.    
Throughout the 1960s, Ethiopia was one of the top ten recipients of aid from Italy, 
but the primary form of aid was through debt re-scheduling and war reparations.  War 
reparations to Ethiopia were significantly reduced after representatives from the Italian 
Commission of Foreign Affairs travelled to Ethiopia for an assessment in 1966.  One of 
the members, Mario Pedini, stated:  
“We found Ethiopia in full development.  The impetus and activism left 
by the Italian presence there- which, according to Ethiopians’ evaluations 
too, has liquidated a past in some respects medieval- has represented a 
useful foundation to lead the country to a deeper awareness, namely to 
prepare it for the initiatives needed to pass from a subsistence economy to 
a developed one.”100 
 
Not only does this statement perpetuate the myth of the Italian brava gente, but it 
insinuates positive effects from Italian colonialism in order to justify withdrawing war 
reparations.  This shows an early example of Italy utilizing its colonial past for foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Toscone,130.   
 
	   44 
policy, however in this context, the primary concern was withdrawing money since 
Ethiopia and provisions of the aid did not provide other substantial opportunities for Italy.   
 Italy’s support for Haile Selassie further resembles the personal connections and 
influence of charismatic leaders in forming Italian foreign policy.  Despite Haile 
Selassie’s blatant violation of democratic principles towards the Eritreans, Italy supported 
and sent aid to Ethiopia.  Although Eritrea was not recognized as a sovereign state at the 
time and no foreign policy documents would reflect support directly to the Eritrean 
people, the fact that they underwent so much suppression clearly indicates that they 
would not benefit from Italian aid.   These agreements included measures to settle 
financial issues, loans to the Ethiopian government, economic collaboration, and even 
creating Italian schools and scholarships for Ethiopian students. 
This approach highlights Italy’s general apathy towards the region and of the 
actual situation in Ethiopia, which continued past the Cold War.  Ethiopia has been 
involved in several wars, where Ethiopia has been considered the aggressor including the 
thirty-year struggle for Eritrean independence.  Ethiopia also invaded Eritrean territory in 
1998, after agreeing to adhere to the decision of an independent Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission, which ruled in favor of Eritrea.101 Ethiopia has also been involved 
with multiple border conflicts with Somalia since both states achieved independence.  
Despite these conditions, Ethiopia has the most bilateral agreements with Italy than any 
other former colony.  These agreements primarily allow for rescheduling debt payments 
and humanitarian aid and development and have occurred consistently, regardless of 
Ethiopia’s human rights violations or war crimes.  However, while Italy provided this aid 	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and debt rescheduling for Ethiopia, it was also establishing economic ties with Eritrea, 
while the two countries were at war.  This allowed Italy to play the role of “peace-maker” 
while remaining relatively removed from the actual situation.   
However, as these conflicts persisted, more Ethiopians began migrating and 
seeking asylum in Italy.  In 2000, 201 Ethiopians arrived in Italy seeking asylum.  In 
2005, 1,065 Ethiopians arrived and by 2013, there were 2,451.102  Although this increase 
is not as drastic as the amounts of migrants and asylum seekers from Somalia and Eritrea, 
there is still a clear increase.  It further represents the overall increase in migration from 
the Horn of Africa.   
Despite this increased migration and the fact that Ethiopian actions in Eritrea and 
Somalia directly contributed to more migration from those states, Italy did not make any 
sort of agreements with Ethiopia concerning migration or stipulating conditionalities to 
promote human rights in the region.  As previously discussed, the political framework 
surrounding migration was based on security and border control which is reflected in its 
foreign policy priority with strengthening border control around Libya.  Libya received 
more aid due to its status as a transit country for migrants, including those from Ethiopia. 
	  
Eritrea 
Although Eritrea is a significant country of origin for refugees and asylum seekers 
into Italy, strengthening Libyan border controls served as the primary means for 
preventing Eritrean migration.  Italy acknowledges but does not apologize for the 
colonial relationship with Eritrea, as Eritrea only provides limited opportunities for Italy 	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in terms of preventing migration.  These limited opportunities do resemble those with 
Libya, especially through lucrative economic cooperation agreements with a 
controversial leader to justify other political means. For these reasons, Eritrea did not 
receive as preferential treatment in terms of foreign aid and colonial apologies as Libya in 
Italian foreign policy.   
 When discussing Eritrea, it is important to acknowledge the authoritarian nature 
of President Isaias Afewerki who has held his office since the establishment and 
independence of Eritrea in 1991.  According to the Human Rights Watch, “Eritrea has no 
constitution, functioning legislature, independent judiciary, elections, independent press, 
or nongovernmental organizations; it does not hold elections.”103  The many controversial 
practices include forced conscription in the national service, arbitrary arrests, prolonged 
detention, and reprisals against family members.  In Eritrea there is also no freedom of 
religion, freedom of expression or freedom of association.104  Furthermore, Eritrea is one 
of the least developed countries in the world, with an average annual per capita income of 
$403 in 2010 for a population of about 5.3 million.105  Eritrea has large fiscal and trade 
deficits, a high proportion of public debt in proportion to GDP, and limited opportunities 
for private sector involvement which has resulted in an unstable and weak economy.106 
These conditions have caused international criticism for human rights abuses and have 
led to thousands of Eritreans feeling the country.   
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 The extremity of the situation in Eritrea is undoubtedly due to the ongoing 
conflicts with Ethiopia, which are a direct result from border designations from Italian 
colonialism and subsequent on-going border disputes, despite rulings from international 
courts.107  Eritrea is consistently ranked among the top ten refugee producing countries in 
the world, and according to the UNHCR, 236,059 refugees left Eritrea between 2000 and 
2010.108 These conditions have caused Eritreans to flee and seek asylum, many of which 
arrived in Italy and now Eritrea is one of the primary countries of origin for asylum 
seekers and refugees in Italy. In 2000, only 16 Eritrean asylum seekers entered Italy, 
which rose to 2705 in 2005 and has continuously increased since.  There were 7,404 
Eritreans who entered Italy in 2007, 10,377 in 2009, 11,206 in 2011, and 13,841 in 
2013.109 
Italian involvement in the conflicts has been relatively minimal but Italy has 
recognized the historical and colonial past with Eritrea, although there have not been 
apologies as accorded to Libya.  For example, Italian politician Alfredo Mantica of the 
right wing National Alliance Party and the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs under 
Silvio Berlusconi in 2008 acknowledged how “Eritrea is ruled by an authoritarian 
government that is constantly taking on more repressive actions that have caused the 
collapse of the economy and a mass exodus of the population who are also trying to 
escape from military conscription that is resulted from the unresolved conflict with 
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Ethiopia.”110  However, at the same time Mantica emphasizes the importance of the 
“remaining European presence, which is not only significant for the legacy of colonialism 
but also for the strong bonds that have survived decolonization.”111  Furthermore, when 
Foreign Minister Piselli visited Eritrea in July of 2014, he announced how “if we manage 
to resume our bilateral collaboration and to forget any recriminations, which belong to 
the history of our relationship and must no longer influence it in the present, then the 
potential for both Italy and Eritrea is enormous, and all to our mutual advantage.”112 
While this statement does acknowledge the contentious history between the two 
countries, there is no sense of apology or regret for the damage Italy caused, and insists 
on moving on rather than making retributions as was the case with Libya.   
Piselli went on to explain how  
“I came here to enable Italy and Eritrea to embark on the road to 
cooperation in all sectors of mutual interest, given that many of the 
security and migration problems that affect Italy actually originate in this 
part of the region.  To achieve that cooperation, I wanted to clarify, in 
person, to President Isaias here in Asmara that Italy is ready to show a 
new willingness to engage and to rekindle that mutual trust that has been 
lacking between our two countries for many, too many, decades.”113   
 
This statement does resemble Italy’s willingness to work with Colonel Gaddafi who was 
also a highly criticized world leader.  It also clearly states that cooperation between 
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Eritrea and Italy will help the migration problems in Italy, which further shows Italy’s 
willingness to violate international norms to address migration.   
Although there is an emphasis on cooperation, given the weak state of the Eritrean 
government and economy, Italy has minimal possible economic gains from this 
cooperation and Eritrea is the main beneficiary.  Despite minimal political and economic 
involvement after the fall of Italian colonialism in 1941, Italy began to establish relations 
with Eritrea in 1993 after independence in 1991.  Italy was one of the first countries to 
recognize Eritrea’s independence and set forth several economic agreements.  By 2010, 
nearly 60% of Eritrean exports to Europe are to Italy, and about 30.5% of all Eritrean 
exports went to Italy. Furthermore, about 14% of the total 38% of imports from Europe 
are from Italy.   
The Eritrean ambassador in Rome explained in a speech in February 2015 that; 
 “the most problematic issue is poverty- until there is a development acceptable in 
Eritrea, there will always be Eritreans fleeing.  Eritrea is poor.  Our economy is post-war, 
we are poor, we are not giving our young people a job.  But we offer free education from 
beginning to end.  We are making huge efforts, huge investments in our young people, 
but with a poor economy we are not able to offer young people what they dream.”114   
 
However, at the same meeting where the Eritrean Ambassador met with Federica 
Mogherini, members of the Italian government, and of the Norwegian Swedish and 
English delegations, he acknowledged Eritrea’s role in Europe’s migration problems.  He 
identified Eritreans as the main victims of human trafficking as said “we are willing to 
exchange information and work together because human trafficking is primarily about 
us.”115  Although he did not address the numerous human rights violations and those 
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seeking asylum and cases outside human trafficking, these statements show how the 
Eritrean government is aware of the need to address migration and cooperation with the 
European Union and Italy if they wish to have any sort of economic cooperation.   
However, past economic agreements between the European Union (led by Silvio 
Berlusconi) and Eritrea did not end successfully, as Afwerki did not sufficiently meet the 
European conditions of the €122 million aid and development package from the European 
Development Funds.   
Although the Eritrean government blames the economic situation for the mass 
exodus of Eritreans into Italy and Europe, the most common reason cited by Eritrean 
nationals, particularly by men, was the practice of forced military service.116  Women also 
cited escaping military services as a reason for escaping Eritrea, but also emphasized 
reasons related to the impact of the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia and 
many also mentioned the desire to improve their economic situation.117  All of these 
competing factors for Eritrean migration influence Italy’s foreign policy approach 
towards Eritrea and how it attempts to prevent migration.   
The cooperation agreements between Italy and Libya have allowed the Italian 
authorities to deny access to the asylum process and entry into Italy for many Eritrean 
nationals.  On 21 July 2004, 110 Eritrean nationals were returned to Eritrea from Libya 
where they were immediately arrested upon arrival and held in incommunicado detention 
in a secret prison.118 On 27 August 2004, as 75 Eritrean men, women, and children were 
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being returned on a flight from Libya to Eritrea, a group of them hijacked the military 
plane and landed it in Sudan so they would not be subject to persecution in Eritrea.119 This 
type of return is directly related to the technical cooperation agreements between Libya 
and Italy to strengthen borders and further shows how Libya’s status as a transit country 
for migrants is what gave it so much preferential treatment in terms of foreign aid and 
colonial apologies when compared to the other former colonies. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Italian foreign policy has clearly shown a preferential treatment to Italy, and 
although this favoritism is justified on colonialism, there are not any sort of consistent 
apologies or provisions of aid to any other former colonies.  Many factors contribute to 
this special treatment, such as Gaddafi’s strong personality and unique form of diplomacy 
and the connections between the Libyan and Italian economies.  However, the primary 
reason Libya receives significantly more aid and diplomatic recognition is because of 
Libya’s status as a transit country for migration into Europe.  Throughout recent decades, 
political rhetoric in Italy surrounding migration has influenced this relationship.  
Although other former colonies have been primary origin countries for migrants and 
asylum seekers into Italy, especially Albania and Ethiopia and Eritrea while at war, 
Libya’s status as a transit country has given it an advantage.    
 Migration has consistently been a driving force behind Italian foreign policy.  
Under the Gaddafi regime, Libya provided the best opportunity to have an immediate and 
drastic effect on migration flows, as Libya is a primary transit country for migrants 
entering Italy.  Since Libya has been in civil war, the foreign policy has shifted to the 
countries of origin and has provided more negotiations and agreements to its former 
colonies.  However, Albania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia do not provide as great of 
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opportunities at combatting migration into Italy so they are not allotted the same level of 
foreign aid and colonial apologies as Libya.    
	   54 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
“Accordo di cooperazione culturale, scientifice e tecnologica: tra la Repubblica Italiana e 
la Grade Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista.” Archivio dei Tratti 
internazionali Online, 2003. 
 
Ambrosini, Maurizio.  “Immigration in Italy: Between Economic Acceptance and 
Political Rejection,” International igration & Integration (2013) 14: 175-194.  
DOI: 10.1007/s1213401102313  
 
Asmelash, Semere. “Eritrean ambassador in Rome: full cooperation on immigration” 
Dehai (February 13, 2015)  
http://www.dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/2015/feb/0263.html 
 
“Central Mediterranean Route” Frontex, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-
routes/central-mediterranean-route/. 
 
Chelotti, N. and E. Johansson-Nogués.  “An assessment of Italian-Libyan relations,” in 
Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century: A Contested Nature? Edited by 
Ludovica Marchi, Richard Whitman & Geoffrey Edwards.  New York: 
Routledge, 2015.   
 
“Colonel Gaddafi’s over here, Mr Berlusconi… Silvo is rather taken by Libyan leader’s 
honour guard.” Daily Mail, June 11, 2011, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1192117/Colonel-Gaddafis-Mr-
Berlusconi--Silvio-taken-Libyan-leaders-honour-guard.html 
 
Cuttitta, Paolo.  “Readmission in the Relations between Italy and North African 
Mediterranean Countries.”  Unbalanced Reciprocities: Readmission Agreements, 
Middle East Institute Special Edition Viewpoints 
 
Cuttitta, Paolo.  “Yearly quotas and country-reserved shares in Italian immigration 
policy.”  Migration Letters, 5(1) 41-51.  April 2008. 
 
Davidson, Jason W.  “Italy at War: Explaining the Italian Contribution to the Kosovo 
War (1999).”  In Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The New 
Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power, edited by Giampiero Giacomello and 
Bertjan Verbeek, 92–112. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011. 
 
 
De Cesari, Chiara.  “The paradoxes of colonial reparation: Foreclosing memory and the 
2008 Italy-Libya Friendship Treaty,” in Memory Studies 5(3) 316-326.  DOI: 
10.1177/1750698012443888  
 
Donadio, Rachel.  “Turmoil in Libya Poses Threat to Italy’s Economy,”  New York Times 
March 6, 2011, pg. 10. 
	   55 
 
European Court of Human Rights, “Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy,” Application No. 
27765/09 (February 23, 2012).  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109231 
 
Ferrari, Federica, and Alessandro Pejrano. “Con Stile: Personality and Leadership Styles 
in Italy’s Foreign Policy.” In Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: 
The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power, edited by Giampiero 
Giacomello and Bertjan Verbeek, 92–112. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011. 
 
Harbeson, John W.  “Ethiopia’s Extended Transition,” in Journal of Democracy; Oct 
2006; 16, 4, pp 144-158. 
 
Hamood, Sara.  “African Transit Migration Through Libya to Europe: The Human Cost.”  
The American University in Cairo: Forced Migration and Refugee Studies.  
January 2006.   
 
Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2014: Eritrea” http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/eritrea 
 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development.  East Africa Migration Route 
Initiative Gaps & Needs Analysis Project Country Reports: Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Libya.  East Africa Migration Route Initiative. 2008. 
 
International Crisis Group.  “Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support.”  
Africa Report N. 170- 21 February 2011 
 
“Italy Copes with Albanians,” Migration News 4, No. 4 (April 1997) 
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1205 
 
“Italy: Press Gaddafi to Halt Violence Against Protesters,” Human Rights Watch, 
(February 23, 2011) http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/23/italy-press-gaddafi-
halt-violence-against-protesters.  
 
Kashiem, Mustafa Abdalla A.  “The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation 
between Libya and Italy: From an Awkward Past to a Promising Equal 
Partnership.”  California Italian Studies 1(1): 1-15, 2010 
 
Kay, Sean.  “From Operation Alba to Allied Force: Institutional Implications of Balkan 
Interventions” Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 1999. 
 
Magnani, Natalia.  “Immigration control in Italian political elite debates: Changing policy 
frames in Italy, 1980s-2000s,” in Ethnicities 12(5): 643-664.  DOI: 
10.177/1468796811432693  
 
	   56 
Mantica, Alfredo. “Dettaglio articolo” (June 8, 2011) 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/06/20110
608_manticacornoafrica.html 
 
Marchetti, Chiara. “Expanded Borders: Italy and Preventive Refoulement.” In Migration, 
Minorities and Citizenship: The Politics of International Migration 
Management, edited by Martin Geiger and Antoine Pecoud. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010. 
 
Marko, Juliana.  “Economic Relations between Italy and Albania 1993-2000”  
International Scientific Journal  136-141. 
 
McCormick, John. Why Europe Matters: The Case for the European Union. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
 
Mezzetti, Petra and Matteo Guglielmo. “Somali Diaspora Associations in Italy: between 
integration and transnational engagement.” Centro studi di politica internazionale 
(October 2009): 
http://www.cespi.it/WP/WP%2062%20Mezzetti%20Diaspeace%20FINAL.pdf. 
 
Migration Policy Institute.  “International Migrants by Country of Destination, 1960-
2013.”  http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/international-
migrants-country-destination-1960-2013?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true  
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri.  Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, 
Uffico IV.  “Stream” 2013-2015 SOMALIA.   
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, “Deputy Minister 
Pistelli’s mission to the Horn of Africa.  Visit to Eritrea,”  (June 2, 2014). 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2014/07/2014
0702_eritrea.html 
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, “Frattini’s mission to 
Libya- Italy confirms its role of ‘leading player’ in post-Gaddafi Libya” 
(September 29, 2011) 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09
/20110929_missionelibia.html 
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, “Immigrants: Gentiloni 
calls for stronger EU-Africa cooperation 58 countries sign ‘Rome Declaration” on 
development and combatting trafficking,” (November 26, 2014). 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2014/11
/20141126_processorabat.html 
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, “Libbya: Frattini, the 
situation is extremely grave.  Europe must shoulder responsibility for the flows of 
	   57 
migrants” (February 24, 2011) 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/02
/20110224_libia_situazione_gravissima.html 
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazione. “Missione del 
viceministro Pistelli nel Corno d’Africa.  Visita in Eritrea.” 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2014/07/2014
0702_eritrea.html/ 
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione, “Somalia at the point of no return,’ 
says Terzi” (February 23, 2012): 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2012/02/20120
223_terzi_somalia.html 
 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione, “Somalia-Italian Embassy to open in 
Mogadishu by the end of 2011, says Mantica” (October 12, 2011): 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/10
/20111012_somalia_mantica.html 
 
Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich, “Migration after the Arab Spring” Migration 
Policy Center Research Report (September, 2012) 
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf 
 
Pisano, Vittorfanco S.  “Libya’s Foothood in Italy” in The Washington Quarterly, 5(2), 
179-182, 1982 DOI:10.1080/01636608209477565  
 
“Protocolo tra i respettivi ministeri della difesa di attuazione dello scambio di lettere de. 
25.03.1997, Relative alla Collaborazione per la prevenzione degli atti illeciti che 
ledono l’ordine giuridico nei due paesi e l’immediato aiuto umanitario quando 
e’messa a rischio la vita di coloro che tentano di lasciare l’albania”  Archivo dei 
Trattati internzionali Online (April 2, 1997). 
 
Questions and Answers: The Most Frequently Asked Questions about the Refugee 
Convention.” Refugees (2001) Volume 2, Number 123: 16-17. Edited by Ray 
Wilkenson. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b5e90ea0.html. 
 
Ronzitti, Natalino.  “The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between 
Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?”  Bullitin 
of Italian Politics 1(1), 2009, 125-133. 
 
Siphamandla Zondi and Emmanuel Rejouis, “The Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict and 
the Role of the Internatinal Community” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 
6, no. 2 (2006).   
 
	   58 
Suo, Desiree M. “The Formation of Immigration Law in Italy: Between Policy, Parties, 
Press and Public Opinion in 2007” Thesis submitted to the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. 
 
The World Bank, “Eritrea Overview” 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/eritrea/overview 
 
Tiziana Torresi, “An Emerging Regulatory Framework for Migration: The Libya-Italy 
Agreement and the Right of Exit,” Griffith Law Review 22, no. 3 (2013).  
Doi:10.1080/10383441.2013.10877016. 
 
Tosone, Lorella.  “Italy’s Policy of Cooperation for Development: A ‘Natural Vocation’ 
for Rhetoric?”  UNISCI Discussion Papers, No 25 (January 2011)  ISSN 1696-
2206 
 
Tripodi, Paolo.  “Italy and Somalia: A Singluar Relationship” in International Relations, 
vol XIV, no 3, April 1998. 
 
Tronvoll, Kjetil.  “The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea: Human Rights and 
Political Development, 1991-2009.” The Oslo Center.  2009.   
 
Zondi, Siphamandla and Emmanuel Réjouis.  “The Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict and 
the Role of the International Community”  
 
   
 
 
 
